Abstract The paper concerns a risk assessment and management methodology in critical infrastructures. The aim of the paper is to present researches on risk management within the experimentation tool based on the OSCAD software. The researches are focused on interdependent infrastructures where the specic phenomena, like escalating and cascading eects, may occur. The objective of the researches is to acquire knowledge about risk issues within interdependent infrastructures, to assess the usefulness of the OSCAD-based risk manager in this application domain, and to identify directions for further R&D works. The paper contains a short introduction to risk management in critical infrastructures, presents the state of the art, and the context, plan and scenarios of the performed validation experiments. Next, step by step, the validation is performed. It encompasses two collaborating infrastructures (railway, energy). It is shown how a hazardous event impacts the given infrastructure (primary and secondary eects) and the neighbouring infrastructure. In the conclusions the experiments are summarized, the OSCAD software assessed and directions of the future works identied.
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• to identify and introduce risk control measures (countermeasures) to eliminate or reduce potential harms to people, environment, or other assets.
Risk management is broadly applied in many domains of application [2] , however risk management in critical infrastructures is a more complex issue and still remains a challenge.
Critical infrastructures (CIs) consist of large scale infrastructures which, when degraded, disrupted or destroyed, are likely to have a serious impact on health, safety, security or well-being of the society or eective functioning of governments and/or economies.
CI is a very complex socio-technical system, sometimes called a system of systems. The system of systems (SoS) is composed of multiple, heterogeneous, distributed, occasionally independently operating systems which are embedded in networks at multiple levels and evolve over time [3] .
Typically, such infrastructures are energy, oil, gas, nance, transport, telecommunications and health sectors.
In order to function properly, CIs need many dierent assets (technological, IT hardware, software, environmental, personal, organizational) and complex processes interrelated with other processes across dierent economy sectors.
Assets and processes of critical infrastructures may be breached by dierent kinds of threats and hazards, such as: natural disasters and catastrophes, technical disasters and failures, espionage, international crime, physical and cyber terrorism. CIs are extremely important for today's societies and ensure proper relationships between the citizens and governments. The well developed countries, including the EU countries, are more focused on the protection of their critical infrastructures than the others. The European Council (EC) Directive [4] species the CIP-related needs on the EU and member-state levels. The EC Directive provides a denition of ECI (European critical infrastructure) and its basic taxonomy.
ECI means`critical infrastructure located in member states the disruption or destruction of which would have a signicant impact on at least two member states'. ECIs are identied in particular countries with the use of sectoral criteria and cross-cutting criteria. The criteria include casualties, economic and public issues. The ECI taxonomy will be presented in Sec. 3.2.
The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) is aimed at European and national infrastructures. EPCIP was elaborated in 2006. Its revised and more practical implementation is included in the EC document [5] .
The paper presents the continuation of the researches described in the author's earlier publications. The paper [6] identies the basic requirements for the risk management software. The implementation of these requirements is discussed in the publication [7] . This implementation is based on the ready-made OSCAD platform [8] . This software was originally developed to support business continuity management according to ISO 22301 and information security management according to ISO/IEC 27001. It is designed to identify dierent disturbances of business processes and/or breaches of information assets in dierent companies and organizations. OSCAD has three main functionalities: to perform risk management (preparedness), to manage incidents (reaction, recovery), and to ensure a continual improvement of the security-related management processes.
Thanks to its openness and exibility, the OSCAD software can be easily adapted to protect assets or processes in dierent application domains, e.g.: ood protection [9] , railway safety management systems [10] and coal mining [11] . The question is whether it can be applied to a new domain of application, i.e. critical infrastructure risk management.
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The OSCAD risk management functionality is the subject of the case study presented here.
The aim of the study is to assess the OSCAD usability with respect to the critical infrastructure domain of application. Two groups of requirements are taken into account:
• general requirements for the critical infrastructure risk manager specied in [6] ,
• specic requirements implied by the European CIRAS 1 project [12] .
The activities presented here can be considered as the preliminary researches of the CIRAS project.
CIRAS, related to`The Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security-related Risks Programme (CIPS)', was launched by the international consortium, including the author's organization:
• ATOS Spain SA (ATOS),
• Centre for European Security Strategies from Germany (CESS),
• Institute of Innovative Technologies EMAG from Poland (EMAG).
The CIRAS methodology is based on the FP7 ValueSec approach [13] . According to this approach, the decision maker should select a countermeasure that:
• properly reduces the risk volume to ensure security on an accepted level and to bring benets for CI stakeholders,
• is cost-eective during implementation and operation,
• is free of social, psychological, political, legal, ethical, economical, technical, environmental, and other limitations; these intangible factors in the CIRAS project are called`qualitative criteria'.
The novelty of the CI risk management method presented in the paper is to analyze direct primary impacts caused by a hazardous event in the given CI, as well as the event secondary impacts in the same CI (internal escalation) and in other co-operating CIs (external escalation).
This method was embedded into the CI resilience analysis process (Sec. 2.2) and implemented by the author on the OSCAD platform.
The objective of the paper is to perform the validation experiment of this method on the near real data related to the given set of CIs. The experiment embraces:
• planning the validation scenario, which should be relatively simple, but presenting all features of the method,
• identifying the input data, e.g.: assets, processes, threats, vulnerabilities, etc. and implementing them in the software, 1 This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reects the views only of the author, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein (Grant Agreement clause).
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• dening the risk measures for risk analyses focused on both consequences and causes, and conguring the software tool,
• performing the validation based on the planned scenario and with the use of the OSCAD tool,
• summarizing researches with respect to the acquired risk-related knowledge, usefulness for the OSCAD adaptation to the CIRAS project needs.
As a result of researches, OSCAD-CIRAS, a CI-dedicated risk manager was developed. The results of the author's researches are used as the project input to indicate directions for more comprehensive researches according to the CIRAS project schedule.
The paper includes: a short review of the critical infrastructure specic issues and the state of the art related to risk management in CIs (Sec. 2), preparations to the validation (Sec. 3), the validation process (Sec. 4), and conclusions.
2 Critical infrastructure security and safetyspecific issues Critical infrastructures are very complex socio-technical systems. It is a dicult task to protect them due to their complexity, heterogeneity, distributed nature and existing interdependencies.
Apart from interdependencies, the resilience issue and its relationship with risk management are specic for the critical infrastructures.
Interdependencies and phenomena related to them
Interdependencies are dierent mutual dependencies between co-operating infrastructures. Generally, dependency denes a unidirectional relationship between infrastructures, while interdependency denes a bidirectional relationship. Researches [14, 15] distinguish four types of interdependencies: physical, cyber, geographical, and logical ones.
Certain specic eects implied by interdependencies are observed in critical infrastructures:
• a cascading eect [2] should be understood as a sequence of component failures when the rst failure shifts its load to one or more nearby components; these components fail and, in turn, shift their loads to other components, and so on,
• an escalating failure is when a disruption in one infrastructure causes an independent disruption in another infrastructure [14] ,
• common cause failures; they are failures implied by a single shared cause and may occur almost simultaneously.
Dire eects of hazardous events propagate across the collaborating infrastructures because of the existing interdependencies. Frequently, such eects escalate outside the area where they occur and aggravate the consequences of a given event. Due to this situation the second failure is more severe and it takes longer to restore it. Figure 1 Example of a dependency.
Interdependencies and dependencies are expressed by matrices of relationships or by graphs [16] . Dependency diagrams are products provided by the resilience analysis.
Critical infrastructure resilience analysis and risk management
The resilience of a critical infrastructure concerns its ability to mitigate the magnitude or duration of hazardous events, in other words, it concerns the ability to anticipate, to absorb, to react, to adapt to a critical situation, or to recover after the disruptive event. Resilient CIs are resistant to external and internal disturbances and are able to work on an acceptable eciency level even when these disturbances occur.
The relations between the resilience analysis and risk assessment are understood according to the work [16] :`The concept of resilience can be seen as a superset in which typical risk assessment is a complementary part'. The CI resilience analysis process includes the following main activities [16] :
1. Structural analysis of the CImost critical elements, most vulnerable points, dependencies and interdependencies are identied; here dependency diagrams/matrices are elaborated, playing the roles of the CIs static models, 2. Dynamic analysis to identify the most dangerous risk scenariosgenerally, the subject of the analysis or simulation based on the CI static model are: propagation of dire eects of CIs phenomena across interdependent CIs, identication of the threats impact, analyses of common failures, system response to a failure or an incident, recovery process, etc.; as a result the set of risk scenarios is identied, 3. Prioritization of risk scenariospotentially most dangerous scenarios are delivered to the risk management process for a detailed analysis.
(6 of 24) 2.3 Risk management specific issue and state of the art Risk management is the essential part of the resilience process. Special programmes and methodologies which are developed for CI protection are focused on the preparedness and response to incidents. In order to ensure preparedness and incident response ability, it is necessary to identify the risk source, character and level, as well as to implement and monitor the right countermeasures with respect to their eectiveness. Eective CIs protection is based on risk management.
The risk management methodologies and tools are a subject of current R&D on the national and international levels, including the EU level. An exhaustive review of laws, standards, frameworks, methods and tools was conducted in the course of the CIRAS project [17] . This review refers to the following knowledge sources in the eld:
• the report [18] of the Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen, one of the EC Joint Research Centres (JRC); the report assesses and summarizes 21 existing risk management methodologies/tools on the EU and global level; it identies their gaps and prepares the ground for R&D in this eld,
• the book [15] ; Appendix C compares the features of about 22 commonly used risk analysis methods,
• the EURACOM report [19] features a desktop study of 11 risk assessment methodologies related to the energy sector,
• the ISO 31010 standard [20] describes about 30 risk assessment methods for dierent applications,
• the ENISA website [21] provides an inventory of risk management/assessment methods, mostly ICT-focused.
To secure a better direction of the CIRAS toolset development, it is necessary to carry out certain researches of the existing tools, including the OSCAD tool.
The review based on the elaborated project criteria for methods reected the following characteristics: capability, maturity, adaptability, availability (i.e. copyrights, high license fees), application of qualitative criteria (intangible factors), recognition in the CI application domain, CIs eects inclusion (i.e. interdependencies, cascading/escalation eects). The following preselected methods were assessed:
• Bayesian networks [2, 20] ,
• BIA (Business impact analysis) [20, 22] ,
• Consequences-probability matrix [2, 20] ,
• Bow-tie analysis [2, 20] ,
• CBA (Cost/benet analysis) [13, 20] ,
• ETA (Event tree analysis) [2, 20, 23] , (7 of 24) • FMEA/FMECA (Failure mode eect analysis/Failure mode, eects, and criticality analysis) [2, 20, 24] ,
• FTA (Fault tree analysis) [2, 20, 25] ,
• HAZOP (Hazard and operability) study [2, 20] ,
• LOPA (Layers of protection analysis) [2, 20] ,
• MCDA (Multi-criteria decision analysis) [20, 26] ,
• PHA (Preliminary hazard analysis) [2, 20] ,
• RVA (Risk and vulnerability analysis) [15, 18] ,
Similar criteria were elaborated for tools. In this case the following were considered: tool functionality, maturity, exibility, availability (source code, high license fees), application of qualitative criteria (intangible factors), recognition in the CI application domain, and CIs eects inclusion.
A huge number of preselected software tools were reviewed against the above criteria. There are many dierent risk assessment tools which can be considered to apply in the project domain, e.g.:
• Free web-based fault tree analysis software (FTA) [27] , • THESIS BowTie (Bow-tie analysis, LOPA) [38] ,
• OSCAD (Consequences-probability matrix, BIA) [8] . (8 of 24) During the review the general requirements for CI risk manager identied in [6] were taken into account, i.e. the ability of the method/tool:
• to consider interdependencies and phenomena related to them,
• to analyze consequences and causes of a given hazardous event (the bow-tie risk management concept [2] ),
• to express the most important data included in the risk register; please note that the risk register is a managed inventory of hazardous events,
• to dene risk measures parameters (e.g.: likelihood, probability, frequency, consequences, their categories, scales of measures) in a exible way.
Apart from the general requirements, the CIRAS project requirements [12] were considered, i.e. the possibility:
• to assess the risk value before and after the countermeasure implementationto identify the risk reduction implied by the given countermeasure,
• to use in the risk management process parameters dealing with the cost, benet, and intangible restrictions [9] ,
• to consider single countermeasures as well as packages of countermeasures,
• to consider several alternative packages of countermeasures, to select the right one for the nal implementation,
• to consider cross-sectoral risk management.
The review shows that many risk assessment methods and tools can be applied in the critical infrastructure domain. They were developed for dierent organizations with a view to solve their technical or organizational risk-related problems within the limited environments. Initially they were not dedicated to critical infrastructures, however, later, many of them were adapted to CI needs.
The reviewed methods [17] do not explicitly distinguish CI internal and external causes of hazardous events. What is more, they do not distinguish CI internal non-escalating consequences, consequences generating hazards/threats in the same infrastructure, and consequences generating external hazards/threats for other collaborating infrastructures either. There is no method which would consider the cost, benet, and intangible restrictions with respect to the CIs.
The paper [7] describes how the general purpose risk manager implemented in the OSCAD software could be adapted to the CIs application. This paper also presents the validation plan of the OSCAD-CIRAS tool, based on the dened scenario which is focused on the railway transport CI interacting with the electricity CI. OSCAD-CIRAS is able to distinguish internal and external causes of hazardous events as well as internal and external consequences implied by these events.
Due to the CIs complexity, interdependencies, specic eects, dierent abstract levels applied to manage CIs (national, sectoral, operational) and other factors, the risk management in critical infrastructures still remains a challenge. (9 of 24) 3 Preparing the OSCAD-CIRAS validation process
The subject of the validation is the OSCAD-CIRAS experimentation tool presented in the publication [7] . The aim of the validation is to get knowledge about risk issues through performing a representative use case in critical infrastructures and to assess whether the validated tool can be useful for the CIRAS project.
3.1 Critical infrastructure risk management requirements and their implementation in the OSCAD software The paper [7] presents the OSCAD software adapted for risk management experimentations in critical infrastructures (OSCAD-CIRAS) and basic scenarios of these experiments with respect to such CIs phenomena as escalations and cascading eects implied by the CIs interdependencies.
The process of meeting the requirements can be summarized as follows:
Bow-tie as the conceptual model of the risk manager OSCAD-CIRAS has a functionality to analyze the multidimensional consequences of hazardous events:
• Asset Oriented Business Impact Analyzer (ABIA),
• Process Oriented Business Impact Analyzer (PBIA),
as well as functionalities to analyze the causes of hazardous events:
• Asset Oriented Risk Analyzer (AORA),
• Process Oriented Risk Analyzer (PORA).
Each pair: AORA-ABIA and PORA-PBIA can be understood as the bow-tie model implementation.
Implementation of the risk register and risk-related data The risk register contains information about assets (and/or processes) impacted during a hazardous event, consequences, event frequency, threats, vulnerabilities, and assessed multidirectional impacts. They are predened and placed in OSCAD-CIRAS system dictionaries, used by the asset and process inventories and by the four above mentioned risk assessment tools.
Risk measures and the assessment process The BIA risk measures expressing multidimensional impacts of the hazardous event encompass loss subcategories belonging to three main impacts categories:
• CI internal degradation/damages (CID),
• generated internal hazards, called here internal escalation eects (IE),
• generated external hazards, called here external escalation eects (EE).
(10 of 24) Please note that the BIA-type method introduced in the paper takes into account hazards generated in the same CI (IE) and hazards generated in the neighbouring CIs (EE) as the distinguished impacts categories.
Distinguishing these three main categories allows to consider dierent CI specic phenomena in risk management. The numbers of loss subcategories and loss levels in loss matrix are congurable.
RA uses event likelihood categories and consequences categories (the latter derived from BIA results). All of them are user-dened.
The assessment process starts from the scenario of the highest criticality obtained from the resilience analysis. First, BIA (a consequences analysis) is performed, and its results encompass CID, IE and EE impacts. Interdependencies and critical infrastructure specic phenomena Before risk management starts, the dependencies should be known. They are identied during the resilience analysis and obtained in the form of a dependency diagram. All possible CI phenomena (Subsection 2.1) can be detected for the set of collaborating infrastructures.
Validation context
The European Council (EC) Directive [4] species two groups of European Critical Infrastructures (ECIs):
• energy, encompassing the following ECIs: Electricity (Ele), Oil (Oil), Gas (Gas), Fig. (2) shows the Rail Transport (RaT), Electricity (Ele), Oil (Oil) and Gas (Gas) critical infrastructures and dependencies between them (a dependency diagram).
OSCAD-CIRAS as the validation subject
The validation process will be focused on railway transport (RaT) collaborating with Electricity (Ele). Fig. (2) shows direct CI damages as well as the propagation path for external and internal eects caused by the hazardous event.
The validation considers:
• threats/hazards issued inside RaT or passed from the external Ele ECI,
• internal consequences of a hazardous event occurring in RaT,
• internally generated escalation caused by a hazardous event,
• impact on the external Ele ECI by generating threats for Ele ECI or increasing vulnerabilities within this infrastructure.
The OSCAD-CIRAS tool is discussed more thoroughly in the publication [7] , therefore only basic information will be presented in the paper.
The adaptation of the open OSCAD software platform to the CI applications embraces the identication of the CI domain data, elaboration of system dictionaries on this basis and conguration of the system as a whole.
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The main (primary) assets of the given CI are the subject of AORA, therefore they are protected. An asset name is preceded by a CI mnemonic, e.g.: RaT:Node, Ele:Power plant. The associations of auxiliary (secondary) assets are grouped around the given primary asset. The secondary assets are not the subject of the AORA analysis. For this reason, a special category of secondary assets A=C (Countermeasures considered as assets) is distinguished to enable risk analysis. These assets represent security-related objects which can be a subject of an attack, e.g. security zone, perimeter. An asset of this category (A=C) can be added to a given asset group.
This approach allows to consider additional eects of security breaches, i.e. secondary eects with respect to the hazardous event. This mechanism allows to analyze the propagation of internal secondary eects (IE).
The risk register is dened in OSCAD as a set of risk scenarios which are identied as threats • IE (Internal escalation eects) express new internally generated threats or new or increased vulnerabilities which inuence the considered CI and are caused by the hazardous event,
• EE (External escalation eects) express generated threats which impact the external CIs or new or increased vulnerabilities in the external CIs and are caused by the hazardous event.
The loss subcategories of these three main categories are dened in the business loss dictionary (Fig. (3) ).
Each category is assessed in the range from level 1 to level 5. The number of subcategories and levels is congurable. In the example presented in the paper the Worst Case Model (WCM) is used to calculate the BIA result, as it is very simple. The BIA result is the maximum value of the CID, IE and EE impacts, it means that the BIA result is in the range 1 to 5. OSCAD-CIRAS allows to apply the product or total calculation models as wellnot discussed here. • 1 (Improbable), extremely rare event (from 0 to 10 −5 per year),
• 2 (Remote), very rare event that will not necessarily be experienced in a similar plant (from 10 −5 to 10 −3 per year),
• 3 (Possible), rare event, but will be possibly experienced by personnel (from 10 −3 to 10 −1 per year),
• 4 (Occasional), event that may happen now and then and will normally be experienced by personnel (from 0.1 to 1 per year),
• 5 (Fairly normal), event that is expected to occur frequently (from 1 to 10 per year).
The RA`Event consequences' measures are derived from the loss matrix categories:
• 1 (Negligible damage), when BIA impact equals 1,
• 2 (Minor damage), when BIA impact equals 2,
• 3 (Major damage), when BIA impact equals 3,
• 4 (Severe loss), when BIA impact equals 4,
• 5 (Catastrophic), when BIA impact equals 5. Please note the numbers in circles which order the sequence of analyses pairs in Fig. (4) . For example,`2ie' means iteration 2 caused by internal eects (ie). The following general scheme of numeration is assumed: iteration number with a postx representing the kind of impact.
For the validation purpose a sequence of scenarios and related analyses is elaborated: (15 of 24) Initiation, a basic scenario obtained from the resilience analysis In RaT:Node an event occurs which causes a hazardous event, e.g. intentional derailment impacting the node area.
1 st iteration`1 ABIA(RaT:Node)' identies the multidimensional consequences of the hazardous event:
• the internal degradation (mostly nancial consequences) caused by the intentional derailment (CID),
• breaches of the security zone which is a secondary asset of RaT:Node (IE),
• impacts of the external infrastructure Ele (EE) occurring because the coal transport for the power plant is stopped for a long time.
1 AORA(RaT:Node)' identies the risk related to this hazardous event based on Eq. (3.3).
2 nd iteration Due to the internal escalation eects (IE), an extra pair of analyses of the security zone is needed:
•`2ie ABIA(RaT:Node->Security zone)',
•`2ie AORA(RaT:Node->Security zone)'.
The related ABIA identies CI secondary damages caused by unauthorized access which occurred after the security zone breach. No further IE or EE impacts are revealed. RA calculates the risk of unauthorized access facilitated by the zone breach.
Due to the external escalation eects (EE), an extra analysis of the energy production/delivery process in the Ele ECI is required.
•`2ee ABIA(Ele:Energy)' identies the CI degradation caused by an externally generated threat and backward external impacts to the RaT infrastructure (energy provision for the RaT:Energy), while it does not identify any internal escalation eects (IE),
•`2ee PORA(Ele:Energy production)' assesses the risk related to the energy production process in the power plant, i.e. assesses how a coal delivery disturbance impacts the energy production process (in this case the process-oriented analysis is applied).
3 rd iteration Due to the external threat generated by Ele ECI for RaT:Energy, an additional pair of analyses is performed:
•`3ee ABIA(RaT:Energy)',
•`3ee AORA(RaT:Energy)'.
The CI internal degradation is assessed and no internal/external propagations are detected. In the 3 rd iteration both RaT and Ele infrastructures achieve a stable state no further analyses are needed.
Particular analyses will be performed during the validation process. 4 The OSCAD-CIRAS validation process Initiation (a basic scenario obtained from the resilience analysis) According to the validation scenario (Fig. (4) ) an event is triggered in the railway node. It is classied as intentional derailment.
1 st iteration This hazardous event is the subject of the 1 ABIA(RaT:Node) consequences analysis. Fig. (6) shows the assessed CI degradation (CID) caused by the impacted nodeimpacts assessed in ve time horizons.
Similar analyses (but without time horizons) are performed with respect to:
• the internal escalation eects attribute (IE), a breach of the security zone is identied, implying`2ie ABIA(RaT:Node->Security zone)' shown in Fig. (8) and`2ie AORA(RaT:Node>Security zone)' in Fig. (9) ; will be analyzed in the 2 nd iteration,
• the external escalation eects attribute (EE) disturbance of the fuel (coal) delivery for the power plant is detected, causing`2ee ABIA(Ele:Energy)' shown in Fig. (10) and`2ee PORA(Ele:Energy production)' in Fig. (11) ; will be analyzed in the 2 nd iteration.
(17 of 24) Figure 6 ABIA analysis for the railway node Source: OSCAD-CIRAS risk manager during validation. Figure 7 Asset-oriented risk analysis for the railway node (a cause analysis). Source: OSCAD-CIRAS risk manager during validation.
After identifying the consequences, the causes are analysed. The basic hazardous event now is the subject of the`1 AORA(RaT:Node)' analysis, shown in Fig. (7) . The vulnerability related to this threat deals with diculties to monitor large areas of the railway node. Inherent risk was 6.0, but after applying certain countermeasures (an example of countermeasures selection during risk management is shown in [7] ) the risk value was decreased to 1.5 (max. value is 25.0). Please note that the countermeasures cost rises from 69.000 PLN to 212.000 PLN. This hazardous event concerns the`RaT:Railway node' asset. Together with this event, two others can be analyzed (power supply failure, equipment theft) related to the same asset (RaT:Railway node).
In this point of the validation scenario the rst (basic) iteration is nalized (a pair BIA-RA).
Please note that both internal and external impacts are detected. These imply the second iteration of the risk analyses encompassing both the internal and external impacts. railway node. Please note that the security zone has twofold meaning (marked as:`C=A', a special asset category [7] ). Firstly, the zone is an asset, as a part of the node facilities. Secondly it is also a countermeasure. It protects some objects in its interior which can be damaged due to the zone breach. These damages are CI internal, secondary eects. These eects can be assessed with the use of the pair of analyses:
•`2ie ABIA(RaT:Node->Security zone)'; consequences analysis ( Fig. (8) ),
•`2ie AORA(RaT:Node->Security zone)'; causes analysis ( Fig. (9) ), The internal escalation constitutes certain internal loops within the considered CI. The internal secondary eects (eects caused by primary eects) follow this path until no further impacts are identiedthe CI damages stabilize.
Fig. (9) shows AORA with respect to the secondary asset`A=C:Security zone', being a part of the previously analyzed primary asset`RaT:Node'. Please note that for the threat`Unauthorized accesssecurity zone breached' two vulnerabilities are considered.
In the 2 nd iteration the external escalations should be analyzed, because they were detected in the 1 st iteration. This way the inuence of RaT CI on Ele CI is considered. Figure 10 ABIA for the energy asset provided by the power plant consequences analysis Source:
OSCAD-CIRAS risk manager during validation.
The disturbances of the energy production process may negatively inuence the basic asset the energy delivered to customers, including railways. The CID degradation was assessed rather low (not shown), and no further internal consequences are generated (simplication).
Only the Ele external escalation may occur (Fig. (10) ), i.e. disturbance of the energy delivery.
It is assumed that this problem may touch the energy provision for the railway CI (see further (Fig. (11) ).
The PORA analysis considers the energy production process. The fuel (coal) delivery disturbances (threat), with the coincidence of insucient fuel in stock (vulnerability), may break the energy production process eciency or even the continuity of the process.
3 rd iteration Stoppages in energy delivery by the external provider (a threat), coupled with the sensitivity to overloads (a vulnerability), may disturb the work of electrical equipment placed in the railway node.
Loss of the power supply quality (breaks, low quality) impacts the considered node, but this impact is rather limited (CID) because there are redundant power lines for the node. Moreover no serious IE/EE eects are escalated. Fig. (12) shows the external eects assessment. AORA (Fig. (13) ) is focused on the causes of the energy disturbance in the node.
The risk value for the pair:
• the threat`Break in energy supply',
• the vulnerability`Sensitivity to overloads', was suciently mitigated from 6.0 to 0.67 by electrical infrastructure investments in the past. As a result of these investments, the railway node is supplied by three independent energy sources. The validation according to the planned scenario was performed successfully, but some issues require comments.
While implementing the novel risk management method OSCAD-CIRAS should be supported by an external graph (a dependency diagram) which guides the risk assessment process. Consequences of hazardous events may propagate only along dependency paths, for this reason dependencies should be known a priori.
The indirect bow-tie model implementation in OSCAD-CIRAS is quite useful. To improve the model management, a certain management mechanism is needed to control the sequences of analyses.
The novelty of the method presented in the paper is the introduction of three CI attributes:
• CID, i.e. CI degradation, expressing dierent impacts to assets, as in traditional risk assessment,
• IE, i.e. internal escalation eects, expressing the security problems issued by the CI to itself,
• EE, i.e. external escalation eects, allowing to express impact of hazardous events on dependent critical infrastructures.
According to these attributes, three kinds of consequence analyses are performed. Moreover, the CID-type consequences can be assessed in several time horizons, as in the business continuity domain. This is also a novel element in the risk management in CIs.
Please note that the escalation path is broken when no other IE/EE impacts are produced. In such a situation no further iterations are issued.
The internal/external escalations concern mostly the threats generation (demonstrated). Moreover, it is possible to express the consequences as the increasing internal/external vulnerabilities (not demonstrated). Please note that the ooding of a certain area, causing dierent damages, such as re and landslides, can weaken the protection system. To consider such vulnerabilities, the threats associated with them should be identied (if exist), and for each threat-vulnerability pair the risk should be assessed.
It is possible to analyze multilayer protection systems related to assets/processes. However, as many iterations are needed, this may be cumbersome.
The AORA and PORA analyses consider cost parameters of countermeasures. In the CIRAS project this functionality will be extended and supplemented by benets and intangible parameters. During the risk management process several security alternatives (each composed from (22 of 24) dierent kinds of countermeasures) can be considered in OSCAD [7] to select the most advantageous one for implementation.
The implemented causes-focused risk analyses (AORA/PORA) and consequences-focused analyses (ABIA/PBIA) are rather simple. In certain applications (multi-layer protection) they may not be sucient. In this case the fault tree analysis [27] approach for causes and the event tree analysis [23] for consequences may be a helpful alternative in certain circumstances. All these conclusions can be considered during the CIRAS toolset development.
The performed researches allow to acquire knowledge about risk issues within interdependent infrastructures needed for the European CIRAS project. The usefulness of the OSCAD-based risk manager in this application domain was assessed and directions for further R&D works were identied. The research results were used in the CIRAS project. The project is at its nal stage now. All pillars: the OSCAD-based risk manager (RRA), the cost-benets component (CBA) and the qualitative criteria component (QCA) were integrated and validated in two project use cases with the stakeholders' participation (big energy provider, large metro transport operator). The results were presented soon during the international nal conference of the project.
